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mammoth dams, lean 
Neighbours: Assessing the bid to 




The ethio–Djibouti railway, inaugurated in 1917, not only crowned the 
modernisation project espoused by emperor menelik ii. it also drastically 
eased the hauling of  bulk quantities of  ethiopian coffee beans to a nearby 
port. Accordingly, sales abroad quadrupled in 10 years and coffee managed to 
prevail over other export commodities throughout the course of  the twentieth 
century. Yet one century after the inauguration of  the ethio–Djibouti railway, 
the primacy of  coffee may now soon come to an end. The ethiopia–Kenya 
electricity highway, to be completed in 2017, is expected to boost revenues 
from electricity exports to $1 billion per year by 2020 (AfDB 2012a; World 
bank 2012a).
cross-border power connections constitute but one component of  an 
ambitious programme first initiated in 2005. Domestically this programme 
also promises to deliver universal access to electricity by 2023. The principal 
aspect of  it though is a massive expansion of  the generation fleet. So far, 
with the recent addition of  three medium-sized hydropower plants – that is, 
Gilgel Gibe ii (420 megawatts (mw)), Tana beles (460 mw) and Tekeze (300 
mw) – the installed capacity in 2010 became already treble that of  2005. Up 
to 27 more dams, totalling almost 25,000 mw, are projected to see the light 
1 As the only contributor whose paper was not discussed at the panel on ‘A New 
Scramble for Africa?: The rush for energy resources Southwards of  the Sahara’, 
held at the 5th european conference on African Studies, i am particularly grateful 
for the editor’s invitation to contribute to this volume as well as for his reviews of  the 
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of  day before 2027 (world bank 2012a). The apex of  dam building will be 
reached with the completion in 2017 of  Africa’s largest hydropower complex: 
the Grand ethiopian renaissance Dam (GerD), which, according to the 
ethiopian authorities, is forecast to generate a peak amount of  6,000 mw. 
more conservatively, the world bank (2012a) lowers its expected capacity to 
5,250 MW. Even abiding by the latter figure the GERD alone will account 
for more than 40 per cent of  the installed generation capacity in the country. 
Such a massive breakthrough will nevertheless be preceded in 2015 by another 
grandiose dam project, Gilgel Gibe iii (1,870 mw), now under construction. 
when commissioned Gilgel Gibe iii will contribute more than 20 per cent of  
the country’s electrical output.
All in all, forthcoming generation facilities will already by 2017 have 
increased ethiopia’s production capacity to a level more than three times 
above that of  the country’s domestic demand. ethiopia is therefore now 
faced with a pressing need to step up the creation of  cross-border links – for 
example the interconnector with Kenya – in order to cash in on the surplus 
of  energy and thus be able to repay the loans borrowed. Predicated upon an 
analogue line of  reasoning, the connections to Kenya are also being devised 
so as to facilitate future exports to the eastern African Power Pool (eAPP). 
Yet the ‘march of  the pylons’ championed by ethiopia stretches in every 
possible direction: towards Djibouti, Kenya, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan 
and even henceforth to new markets as far afield as South Africa, Yemen and 
eventually europe (eePco 2012).2 The both domestic and regional relevance 
of  the Ethiopian electrification scheme is therefore difficult to overstate.
Accordingly, this chapter sets out to discuss its main features as well as the 
key steps towards its implementation. Doing so also allows its potentialities 
and pitfalls to be assessed. T e analysis stems from the review of  the policies 
enacted by the ethiopian authorities, the reports associated with the projects 
implemented by the African Development bank (AfDb) and the world bank, 
as well as of  articles from regional newspapers. for a better understanding 
of  the whole proposed electrification scheme, which spans a timeframe 
running from 2005 to 2023, i differentiate between three phases, each of  
them predicated upon a characteristic balancing of  a triad of  components 
– namely generation, exports and domestic access. In the first section of  
this chapter i analyse the past and present stages of  the scheme (2005–2011 
and 2012–2017), highlighting their respective emphasis on generation and 
2 The term ‘march of  the pylons’ is borrowed from luckin’s (1990) book on 
electricity and the environment in britain during the interwar period. luckin uses it 
to capture britain’s relentless efforts to roll out electricity across the country, which 
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domestic access. The second section touches upon the upcoming third phase 
(2018–2023), underscoring its focus on the exports component. i analyse the 
probability of  exports of  ethiopian electricity occurring to the three major 
markets of  egypt, Kenya and South Africa, and arguably also to Yemen as 
a fourth one. i posit that those markets that are more within reach in the 
medium term than egypt and South Africa are also substantially smaller and 
marked by some uncertainties – namely Djibouti, the Democratic republic 
of  the congo (hereafter the Dr congo), rwanda, Somaliland, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. in the third section i highlight the potential 
pitfalls of  Ethiopia’s electrification scheme – meaning likely environmental 
and financial obstacles.
Overcoming a Century of Electric Scarcity
back in 2001 the ruling ethiopian People’s revolutionary Democratic front 
could hardly point to a single accomplishment having been made in the 
country’s power sector. Access to electricity had merely increased from 10 
to 13 per cent of  ethiopian households since the early 1990s (world bank 
2013). basic calculations based on data from the United Nations Population 
Division and the world bank show that per capita consumption remained 12 
times below the Sub-Saharan average (South Africa excluded).3 Generation 
capacities, meanwhile, amounted to 543 mw – less than those of  mauritius. 
Even five years later progress was still negligible. With only 17 per cent of  the 
population living in electrified areas, five out of  six Ethiopians continued to lack 
access thereto (world bank 2013). rural populations almost without exception 
were kept in the dark, particularly in the lowlands. for those connected to the 
national grid, load shedding exercises and blackouts became almost a daily 
routine. As a result, suppressed demand deprived the ethiopian electric and 
Power Corporation (EEPCo) of  earnings amounting to $0.52 per kilowatt-
hour, more than ten times the existing average tariff  (world bank 2012b).
in 2005 though, new annual grid connections exceeded 100,000 for the 
first time. That same year the updated Ethiopian Power System Expansion 
master Plan (ePSemP) enshrined the goal of  putting a permanent end to 
electricity scarcity. The EPSEMP 2006–2030 specified two chief  objectives: 
expanding both access and consumption per capita, as well as overcoming 
electricity shortages by generating a massive surplus of  cheap electricity that 
3 The according data is available online at: http://esa.un.org/undp/wpp/index.
htm [accessed 25 September 2014]; and at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
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was also suitable for export. Access was set to increase to 75 per cent by 
2016, domestic demand to double in five years and nine countries to become 
potential buyers of  electricity generated in ethiopia: Djibouti, egypt, eritrea, 
Kenya, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen. The ePSemP 
2006–2030 even mentioned the prospect of  making exports to europe, either 
through morocco or Turkey (eePco 2006).
Domestically, rural electrification and the intensification of  urban grid 
connections also benefitted from the establishment in 2005 of  the Universal 
electricity Access Programme and the rural energy Agency. The latter in 
particular contributed to developing mini-hydro schemes in areas untouched 
by the national grid. Accordingly, household access to electricity had increased 
to 45 per cent by 2011. what is more, as mentioned earlier, three medium-
sized hydropower plants went online in 2009 and 2010: Gilgel Gibe ii (420 
mw), Tana beles (460 mw) and Tekeze (300 mw). in 2011 wind energy 
entered into the national grid for the first time. The EPSEMP 2006–2030 had 
already by the end of  2010 succeeded in generating a surplus of  electricity 
for the domestic market, although it amounted to a tiny one of  1 per cent of  
the aggregate demand. This was achieved partly thanks to the two-year partial 
moratorium on new grid connections that was imposed by ePPco in 2008 
(world bank 2012b). consequently, by 2011 power shortages in ethiopia had 
become a thing of  the past.
The first phase of  the electrification scheme also witnessed the beginning 
of  electricity exports. The interconnections with Djibouti and Sudan were 
commissioned in 2011 and 2012 respectively. with electricity costs above 
$0.10 per kilowatt-hour in Djibouti and Sudan, these cross-border connections 
made economic sense. The AfDB volunteered to finance the interconnector 
to Djibouti, featuring a peak exchange capacity of  180 MW. A price of  $0.07 
per kilowatt-hour was agreed, thereby setting the maximum revenue brought 
in at slightly above $50 million per year. Regrettably, in the first 12 months 
of  operation EEPCo merely cashed in $14.6 million, thus revealing earlier 
forecasts as having been too optimistic (AfDb 2012b). one year later the 
price for electricity sales to Sudan was set to a lower figure of  $0.05 per 
kilowatt-hour. Yet again actual earnings fell short of  the target amount, being 
less than $10 million in the first year. The low earnings from exports to Sudan 
were partly due to the two sides’ differences on pricing. These differences 
led to a discontinuation of  the service between April and June 2013. Trade 
only resumed after the Sudanese government had promised to consider an 
increase in the price to on a par with Djibouti’s rate.
During the currently ongoing second phase of  the electrification scheme 
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the generation capacities and the laying of  the first major international 
interconnection, the ethiopia–Kenya electricity highway. These new focuses 
followed again a policy update made earlier in this decade. in 2011 a renovated 
Power Sector Development Programme (2010–2015) was issued (eeP o 
2011). it is a part of  the ePSemP 2012–2037 (eePco 2012). likewise, 
a comprehensive National energy Policy was published in 2013, coherent 
Table 6.1 Ethiopia’s existing and envisaged power stations of  at 
least 100 MW
Note: Additional information has been retrieved from the website of  the eePco. Available 
at: http://www.eepco.gov.et [accessed 25 September 2014].
Source: Kraak (2012).
Name Type Year of commissioning Capacity in MW
Fincha’a Hydropower 1973 134
Melka	Wakena Hydropower 1988 153
Gilgel	Gibe	I Hydropower 2004 192
Tekeze Hydropower 2009 300
Tana	Beles Hydropower 2010 460
Gilgel	Gibe	II Hydropower 2010 420
Ashegoda Wind	power 2014 120
Helele	Werabesa Hydropower 2015 422
Chemoga	Yeda Hydropower 2015 278
Genale	Dawa	III Hydropower 2015 256
Gilgel	Gibe	III Hydropower 2017 1,870
GERD Hydropower 2017 5,250
Debre	Birhan Wind	power Under	construction 100
Corbetti Geothermal Under	development 1,000
Aysha Wind	power Under	development 300
Assela Wind	power Under	development 100
Adama	II Wind	power Under	development 153
Mandaya Hydropower Under	study 2,000
Beko	Abo Hydropower Under	study 1,700
Karadobi Hydropower Under	study 1,600
Gilgel	Gibe	IV Hydropower Under	study 1,472
Baro Hydropower Under	study 896
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with the overarching Growth and Transformation Plan (federal Democratic 
Republic of  Ethiopia 2010, 2013). Some primary goals can be identified from 
these key policy documents: connecting 400,000 additional households to the 
national grid each year, which would push access rates from the previous 
total of  45 per cent in 2011 up to 75 per cent by 2016; the commissioning 
of  Gilgel Gibe iii and the GerD by 2015 and 2017 respectively; and the 
inauguration of  the 2,000 mw interconnection with Kenya in 2017.
Gilgel Gibe iii and the GerD are the largest – but by no means the 
only – new power stations that ethiopia is now seeking to bring online. by 
substantially expanding the generation fleet, as outlined by Table 6.1, a massive 
surplus of  electric energy is likely to be generated. Table 6.2 meanwhile 
aptly illustrates the potential for ethiopian electricity exports in the coming 
years. Taken together with the interconnections to Djibouti and Sudan, it is 
estimated that the ethiopia–Kenya electricity highway will accrue annual 
earnings of  between $300 million and $400 million by 2017, likely only to 
increase in subsequent years (AfDb 2012a).
in fact, ethiopian authorities persistently emphasise the notion that the 
GerD enshrines nothing less than the hopes of  the country for development. 
Such an argument is largely premised upon the supposed potential of  ethiopia 
to generate 45,000 mw exclusively from hydroelectric power – according to a 
figure put forward in 1964 by the US Bureau of  Reclamation Studies. Even if  
to this day the study has yet to be replicated, ethiopian policymakers have still 
accepted that figure and pledged themselves to harnessing the largest possible 
amount of  hydropower. Accordingly, installed capacities are to be expanded 
from the hitherto 2,045 mw to 11,000 mw by 2016 and to 37,000 mw by 
2037 (federal Democratic republic of  ethiopia 2010, 2013; Kraak 2012). A 
note of  caution is needed here, though, since the oft-quoted figure of  37,000 
MW may appear breathtaking at first. Even if  it were to materialise – and 
given that the ethiopian population is projected to reach 155 million people 
in size by 2037 – the country would by then still reach only 27 per cent of  
South Africa’s present per capita generation output.
Stepping Up Exports
The quest for attracting additional customers will be the focus of  the third 
phase of  the electrification scheme, covering the years 2017 to 2023. This is 
understandable given the massive energy surplus available and the need to 
generate earnings in order to repay the loans borrowed for the construction 
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geographical position of  ethiopia poses a comparative advantage given that 
it shares borders with seven different countries (if  one counts Somaliland 
as an independent state). Unsurprisingly, ethiopia has been ascribed a key 
role in the regional trading of  electricity. This has come, for example, in the 
contexts of  the Nile basin initiative – which brings together burundi, the Dr 
congo, egypt, ethiopia, Kenya, rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and 
Uganda – and the North–South Transmission corridor, considered destined 
to connect ethiopia to South Africa by 2020 and to egypt by 2040 (AfDb 
2008; economic consulting Associates 2009).
even though the list of  potential nearby customers is extensive, only 
three of  them qualify as first-rate candidates when taking as a rough criterion 
for this suitability a potential domestic demand of  more than 1,000 mw: 
egypt, Kenya and, most importantly, South Africa. Yemen, which is currently 
considering a 900 mw underwater connection (as Tigrai Online reported on 
6 February 2014), would stand close to being a first-rate customer if  such 
a connection were realised. Direct exchanges with the rest of  the regional 
countries – Djibouti, the Dr congo, rwanda, Somaliland, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda – will remain small, and probably even negligible, 
because of  their low demand and even lower purchasing power (more on 
these small customers later).
The feasibility of  exports to South Africa largely depends on the rate of  
progress henceforth of  a yet to be realised interconnection between Tanzania 
and Zambia. As shown in chapter 5 of  this volume the South African 
government is not foregoing chances for regional cooperation on energy. 
There are, however, major practical obstacles to such projects succeeding. 
Therefore, South Africa’s integrated resource Plan – which is the country’s 
main policy document on energy – only foresees additional electricity imports 
of  2,600 mw until 2030, probably from Southern Africa. ethiopia is not even 
mentioned in the integrated resource Plan (Department of  energy 2011). 
besides, the outlook for ethiopian exports to Kenya and egypt remains 
uncertain. on the one hand, the 2,000 mw interconnector with Kenya is 
making progress and on schedule to be commissioned by 2017. only the 
prevailing conflicts in the borderlands might delay the project given the 
overwhelming confluence of  shared economic and political interests between 
ethiopia and Kenya. on the other hand relationships with egypt are severely 
strained, precisely on account of  the construction of  the GerD. whilst 
egypt is not against the construction of  the GerD per se, it nevertheless 
claims that it should have a stake in at least two major decisions affecting the 
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the reservoir is filled and the handling of  the seasonal flows of  the Nile River 
(Davidson and el wardany 2013).
in fact, the differences of  the two countries over the dam are but an 
additional chapter in the history of  their long-sustained competitiveness 
over harnessing the hydroelectric potential of  the Blue Nile. The conflict 
pits ethiopia, Sudan and to a lesser extent Uganda against egypt in 
a bid to challenge the colonial treaties that in 1929 and 1959 granted the 
latter privileged access to the resources of  the Nile. egypt still has great 
leverage in the ongoing negotiations over this, under the framework of  the 
aforementioned Nile basin initiative. Yet ethiopia has managed to secure 
the support of  Sudan and Uganda for the now-proposed revising of  each’s 
share in the waters of  the Nile. in 2010 it signed a treaty with Kenya, rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda for the exact same purpose. ethiopia appears to feel 
comfortable in pursuing a strategy of  construction projects proceeding whilst 
diplomatic negotiations drag on. Despite its principl d refusal to acquire any 
energy as long as its demands are not met, egypt m y sooner rather than later 
be forced to come to terms with the GerD however. This point is illustrated 
by its recent offer to contribute towards the project’s funding, documented by 
the ethiopian newspaper Reporter on 28 may 2014. A major reason for this is 
that egypt desperately needs to secure additional sources of  energy given that 
its domestic gas deposits are on the decline. relatedly, ethiopia cannot afford 
to lose Egypt as a customer without jeopardising the financial viability of  the 
whole energy exports scheme for the reasons already mentioned.
coming back to the smaller but in the near future more realistic 
international customers for ethiopian electricity the following considerations 
are important:
•	 Djibouti is keen to further tap into cheap ethiopian power in order to meet 
its own growing domestic demand. hence, the existing interconnection might 
in turn be expanded in the near future, also increasing the chances for the 
aforementioned link with Yemen. There is, however, no precise plan on how 
to do this. Nor has the quantity of  additional transmissions yet been specified.
•	 Somaliland is another suitable candidate. Albeit negligible in terms of  market 
size, ethiopian diplomats are particularly keen on a cross-border link with this 
neighbouring state in order to boost their political influence on it. The project 
also makes economic sense. The Somaliland Sun reported on 10 April 2014 that 
electricity tariffs in some towns in Somaliland reach the astronomical figure 
of  $1 per kilowatt-hour, in other words 14 times the price at which Ethiopia 
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•	 Sudan obviously represents a potential destination for additional exports, 
as transmission lines with it are already in place. Yet as the aforementioned 
dispute on tariffs has demonstrated, some doubts remain about its reliability 
as a customer.
•	 Plans to export power to South Sudan are even more questionable given the 
ongoing civil strife there. because of  South Sudan’s current political instability 
any long-term commitment made by its government to import electricity 
from ethiopia can hardly be taken as reliable.
•	 According to an article published in the Financial Times on 16 february 2014 
rwanda and Tanzania are both eager to import ethiopian electricity wheeled 
through Kenya and/or Uganda. for that to materialise the eAPP-sponsored 
interconnections will have to see the light of  day first, a factor that is largely 
outside the control of  ethiopia.
•	 The Ugandan government is currently absorbed in trying to overcome the 
administrative burdens that are preventing the Karuma hydropower Station 
from taking off. This power station was initially discussed in 1995 and is now 
scheduled to reach a capacity of  600 mw. linking with ethiopia does not 
appear to be a priority for Uganda.
•	 As for the remaining candidates, burundi and the Dr congo have only 
expressed a vague interest in importing ethiopian electricity. Non-existent 
diplomatic relations with eritrea, meanwhile, stymie the prospects of  exports 
going there (unless indirectly transported through Sudan).
beyond exports of  electricity, the ethiopian government is also raising 
the stakes considerably by pledging to deliver total national electrification 
by 2023. This goal only seems attainable if  efforts at electrification are 
accompanied by a substantial dose of  creative accounting, predicated upon a 
particular definition of  access. Until now Ethiopian authorities have equated 
access with merely living in an electrified area. Crucial aspects such as the 
actual number of  households connected to the grid or their ability to pay 
for electricity have hence been largely disregarded. Accordingly, the claim 
that 6,000 villages had been electrified by 2011 does not necessarily translate 
into the actual availability of  power for all of  their inhabitants (world bank 
2012b). further compounding the problem, villages featuring less than 200 
households are often considered ineligible for electrification. Therefore, 
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from access to electricity but will not be counted as such in government 
calculations.
Possible Environmental and Financial Pitfalls Ahead
According to the discussion so far, it might appear as if  it were only a 
matter of  time before electricity exports flow out of  Ethiopia and earnings, 
conversely, flow in – at least from its neighbouring countries. As I show in this 
section, there are considerable environmental risks and financial uncertainties 
involved in Ethiopia’s electrification programme though, ones that might 
threaten its ultimate feasibility. other legitimate concerns typical for large-
scale infrastructure projects – such as massive resettlements, local grievances 
and potential trade-offs between domestic and foreign constituencies – will 
not be dealt with here.
To start with, in a country that is more than 80 per cent reliant on 
hydropower not only deep ecologists fear the consequences of  severe 
droughts like those that hit ethiopia in 2003 and 2008. The frequency of  
such droughts is likely to increase because a naturally given tendency for 
highly variable rainfall is now being intensified by man-made climate change. 
The world bank (2014) is also worried about the increasing volatility of  
rain patterns, as is an international panel of  experts mandated to analyse 
the project design of  the GerD. in its report this panel raised a number of  
issues – ranging from the lack of  sensitivity analyses for events associated 
with climate change, for example evaporation and flood frequency, to 
the potential reduction in the capacity of  the dam due to sediment load. 
when sediments accumulate at the bottom of  the reservoir they reduce 
the height of  the water level and hence the volume of  water that can be 
stored in it. The experts warned that the need to ‘stabilize downstream water 
supply […] may result in the GerD being drawn down to the minimum 
operating level for about 15 consecutive years’ (2013, 36). This would hinder 
attempts to operate the GerD at its envisaged peak output of  6,000 mw. 
comparatively minor geothermal, solar and wind developments might prove 
insufficient complements in the event of  a drought or a persistent reduction 
in rainfall, calling into question the prospect of  ethiopia being able to offer 
reliable energy exports. Despite these considerable concerns the ethiopian 
government continues to dismiss any form of  critical analysis. with regard 
to Gilgel Gibe iii, international non-governmental organisations pointed 
out in the past that environmental and social impact assessments were done 
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chain of  smaller dams (Africa resources working Group 2009; international 
rivers 2009).
The financial challenges look even starker. When completed the GERD will 
have drained, in the best-case scenario, $4.7 billion from the Ethiopian public 
coffers. meeting the need to expand and upgrade the domestic transmission 
network is forecast to require an investment of  $1 billion up until 2015. The 
interconnector with Kenya will cost $840 million (AfDB 2010; EEPCo 2011). 
overall, combined efforts in the domains of  power generation, transmission 
and distribution will compel Ethiopia to mobilise $3.4 billion each and every 
year for the next decade – an amount that represents roughly one-tenth of  its 
gross domestic product (foster and morella 2011).
Until now ethiopian authorities have deserved praise for their creativity 
in putting up a variety of  funding arrangements for the infrastructures 
already constructed – not only the AfDb and the world bank, but also 
the european investment bank and the french and italian governments 
have all provided loans for different hydropower schemes. Therefore the 
electrification scheme remains financially on track. $3.5 billion out of  the 
overall 11 billion required for the works envisaged until 2023 has already been 
secured (world bank 2012b). At the same time however, and prompted by 
an urge to speed up construction, the ethiopian government has neglected 
its own procurement legislation. As a consequence multilateral institutions 
have been driven away from supporting Ethiopia’s electrification scheme. 
for Gilgel Gibe iii ethiopia was forced to turn to china and italy. The fact 
that the italian constructor Salini was awarded a contract without bidding 
raised many eyebrows, notably after the investigation in italy of  allegations 
of  corruption in that country’s previous engagement in the construction of  
Gilgel Gibe ii.
Analogue problems also engulf  the GerD, forcing ethiopia to resort to 
self-financing; amongst other means by issuing governmental bonds targeted 
at Ethiopians both at home and abroad. Domestically $367 million has already 
been raised, officially as voluntary contributions exacted from employees in 
the public sector – being equivalent in amount to one month’s worth of  their 
salary (Abbink 2012). At least according to an article in the Reporter on 19 April 
2014, awareness-raising campaigns abroad and the mobilisation of  ethiopian 
embassies have secured a further $250 million from amongst the diaspora. 
Urged by the ethiopian central bank, domestic banks have acquired bonds 
to an amount equivalent to 27 per cent of  their loan portfolio (Davidson 
2014). chinese loans will be used for the construction of  the transmission 
lines required for the GerD, according to an article that was published by 
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Such a massive rate of  borrowing and expenditure might have its downsides 
as well. The international monetary fund (2011) has warned against heightened 
inflation, an unsustainable debt profile and the crowding out of  private sector 
financing. Moreover, the EEPCo’s loan portfolio amounted to $3.5 billion as 
of  2012 – with a staggering $350 million therein earmarked annually to go 
towards the servicing of  debt. The losses of  the EEPCo in the fisc l year 
2016 are estimated to reach 70 per cent of  its total revenue (world bank 
2012a, 2012b). The financial situation of  the EEPCo might be worsened by 
too optimistic calculations having been made with regard to the GerD. The 
aforementioned panel of  international experts (2013) predict the GerD’s 
load factor to be low, and highlight the considerable costs of  transmission to 
the main load centre.4 The latter result from tremendous transmission losses, 
as indicated by Table 6.2. bringing these concerns together with the more 
reasonable estimate of  5,250 mw of  peak capacity, the world bank (2012a) 
expects a shortfall of  $50 to $100 million for the GERD with regard to the 
according financial calculations of  the Ethiopian government. Related to this, 
connections to egypt and South Africa are not to be expected within the 
next 10 years – if, indeed, at all. That will put the financial health of  the 
electrification scheme under further strain, requiring the flexing of  a financial 
muscle that the Ethiopian state will find difficult to grow.
As a consequence of  these financial shortcomings the Ethiopian 
government is likely to be compelled to grant eePco a rise in tariffs in order 
to ensure the full recovery of  costs – something poised to trigger a public 
outcry. Besides, the financial challenges may be further compounded by the 
budgetary overruns often associated with the building of  dams of  the Gilgel 
Gibe iii and the GerD type; not in vain large dams have historically incurred 
a median 27 per cent of  additional costs (Ansar et al. 2014). Apart from 
that, sales to neighbouring countries appear to be persistently falling below 
estimates: Africa Review reported on 15 may 2014 that the ethiopian minister 
of  water and energy acknowledged that exports to Djibouti and Sudan only 
amounted to $33 million in the fiscal year 2013–2014, representing 52 per cent 
of  the earnings that had been budgeted. last but not least, the drive towards 
universal electrification entails huge costs with uncertain returns. The World 
bank accordingly notes that ‘it is uncertain […] that electrifying all rural towns 
and villages over a ten year horizon is economically justified, or represents an 
ideal allocation of  scarce resources in macroeconomic terms’ (2006, 2).
4 The load factor of  a power station is defined as the average load divided by 
the maximum load. A low load factor hence indicates that a power station is used 
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Conclusion
in this chapter i have illustrated the progress of  ethiopia as it bids to become 
the powerhouse of  East Africa. With the GERD as its flagship energy 
project, ethiopia has deployed remarkable capacities and demonstrat d a 
stern determination to push ahead with its plans. The country has had initial 
success in securing the energy sources required to overcome decades of  
power scarcity. ethiopia has also started cashing in from revenue generated by 
making exports of  electricity to two neighbours, Djibouti and Sudan, in a trend 
that is scheduled to grow exponentially in the near future. The government 
plans to reach an electricity generation amount of  11,000 mw by 2016 and 
37,000 mw by 2037. it believes that the hydropower potential of  ethiopia 
is 45,000 MW. Around $1 billion is forecast to result from electricity exports 
each year from 2020 onwards. Going hand-in-hand with this expansion of  
generation capacities is the sharp increase in access to electricity nationwide, 
with it being particularly felt in the highlands.
All in all the thrust to expand the power sector is likely to be sustained, 
wholeheartedly supported as it is by the ethiopian political élite. however, i 
have revealed that the success of  the whole scheme largely rests upon exports 
being made to a small set of  clients themselves harbouring considerable 
domestic demands for electricity: egypt, Kenya and South Africa and 
possibly also Yemen as well. Djibouti, the Dr congo, rwanda, Somaliland, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda constitute probably more realistic 
markets than distant egypt and South Africa do, but they all lack substantial 
demand and are marked by obstacles to receiving ethiopian electricity of  
their own kind. current purchases from Djibouti and Sudan amount to less 
than anticipated, casting a bleak shadow over the forthcoming analogue 
operations. I briefly mentioned Europe as potential customer, even though 
such exports are unlikely to unfold any time soon.
There are also considerable environmental, and especially financial, pitfalls 
ahead. because of  naturally occurring droughts and the ongoing effects of  
climate change ethiopia’s hydropower stations are unlikely to continuously 
reach their envisaged maximum output volumes. The tremendous costs of  
the electrification scheme – standing at $3.4 billion a year – are difficult to 
meet. international organisations have warned against the consequences 
of  vast public debt, including the increasing budget deficit of  the EEPCo. 
The situation is rendered even more risky by probably overly optimistic 
calculations made about construction costs, generation capacities and revenue 
from electricity exports. Yet so far the variety of  funding arrangements, which 
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have provided Ethiopia with a flexibility that – given the sheer size of  the 
electrification scheme being realised – has become crucial for its ultimate 
success. The ethiopian government has even been able to induce public 
servants, national banks and the diaspora to contribute financially to the 
scheme.
Earlier I excluded three specific issues from my analysis: massive 
resettlements, local grievances and potential trade-offs between domestic and 
foreign constituencies. Regarding Ethiopia’s electrification scheme, one may 
speculate that the emphasis on domestic electrification – which runs through 
all three phases of  the scheme – explains why ethiopians have hitherto 
not expressed disgruntlement about the export of  electricity, as citizens in 
the Sub-Saharan energy exporters of  Ghana, Nigeria and to a lesser extent 
South Africa have contrariwise done. The emblematic nature of  the GerD, 
conveniently framed as the embodiment of  national pride, automatically 
equates criticism of  the electrification scheme with a lack of  patriotism. 
future research could thus fruitfully take a closer look at the different ways in 
which legitimacy is obtained for Ethiopia’s ambitious electrification scheme.
As suggested at the beginning of  this chapter, the forthcoming years might 
witness an overturning of  the nature of  ethiopian exports. if  electricity does 
eventually overtake coffee as the main export product, a one century-long 
economic cycle will have come to an end. The implications of  this not only 
stem from the potential of  electricity generation to facilitate industrialisation, 
as compared to the export of  barely processed coffee beans. by exporting a 
considerable amount of  electricity to east African countries ethiopia would 
moreover be in a position to secure a higher degree of  both economic and 
political clout vis-à-vis its neighbouring states. it could aspire to playing a 
role comparable to the status of  regional hegemon currently enjoyed by 
South Africa in Southern Africa. That being the case, a renewed modernist 
drive – embodied in the large dams already constructed and the thousands 
of  kilometres of  power lines laid – could deliver for ethiopia’s political élite 
the political and economic capital that railway tracks yielded for the early 
twentieth century’s imperial rulers.
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